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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-WHO HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
JURISDICTION? THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT ABANDONS A RULE OF
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND ADOPTS THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY
JURISDICTION., VANWAGONER v BEVERLYENTERPRISES 334 Ark. 12, 970
S.W.2d 810 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
The workers' compensation system' provides compensation based on a
statutory scheme to employees who sustain on-the-job injuries and shields
employers from tort liability.2 Workers sustaining compensable injuries are
guaranteed workers' compensation benefits, and therefore, avoid the burden
of proving the employer's fault in a civil suit.3 In return, the employer escapes
litigation costs and potentially high tort damages.4 Workers' compensation
provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries falling within the act's
definitions.' Exclusivity, is therefore, the central feature of workers'
compensation systems.6
In recent years, workers' attempts to circumvent the workers' compensa-
tion system in search of tort damages have met recognized success under
judicial exceptions to the exclusivity principle.' The judicial exceptions
threaten to chip away at exclusivity and encourage employees to seek tort
damages, thus stripping away the employer's protection from tort liability.'
In addition tojudicial exceptions, the workers' compensation system was
threatened by other external factors which challenged exclusivity. Employers
experienced soaring insurance costs due primarily to increased medical costs,
and within the system, fraudulent claims increased." In Arkansas, the
1. Throughout this note, the administrative agency charged with the authority of
interpreting and applying the remedies of a state workers' compensation statute will be referred
to in the generic term of board or commission.
2. See Loretta F. Samenga, Workers' Compensation: The Exclusivity Doctrine, 41 LAB.
L.J. 13, 14 (1990).
3. See id.
4. See Arthur B. Honnold, Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 3 CoRNELL L.Q. 264,
265 (1918).
5. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 14.
6. See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, Practicing in the Evolving Landscape of
Workers' Compensation Law, 14 LAB. LAW. 73, 73 (1998). The bargain struck between
employees and employers whereby an employee gives up the right to bring a tort action in
exchange for guaranteed recovery for compensable injuries is often referred to as the quid pro
quo. See id. Essential to the maintenance of the bargain is the rule of exclusivity which
prevents employees from recovering tort damages for work-related injuries compensable under
workers' compensation. See id.
7. See id
8. See id. at 73-74.
9. See Joseph H. Purvis, From the Respondent: Workers' Compensation Reform: An
Attempt to Save the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg, 27 ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 25.
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legislature responded to the growing crisis with Act 796,10 which curtailed
compensability and cut back the judicial exceptions to exclusivity, thus
making it more difficult for workers to recover."
The recent Arkansas Supreme Court case VanWagoner v. Beverly
Enterprises, " in keeping with the legislative intent of Act 796, overturned past
precedent by adopting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 3 Traditionally in
Arkansas both the courts and the Workers' Compensation Commission had
jurisdiction to determine if an employee's injury was covered by workers'
compensation, an issue crucial to determining if exclusivity barred a tort
remedy. 4 Under a rule of primary jurisdiction, a court cannot decide
questions ofjurisdiction, and the matter must be dismissed for the worker to
file a claim for compensation with the board. ' If the board determines it lacks
jurisdiction, the worker may file a tort action.' 6
This note focuses on the impact that a rule of primaryjurisdiction has on
workers' compensation and the concept of exclusivity. In so doing, it is
necessary to provide a brief introduction to workers' compensation in the
United States, trace the background on primary jurisdiction and exclusivity,
and review how other states have proceeded on the matter. Part II of this note
provides a summary of the VanWagoner decision. Part III examines the
background of workers' compensation and includes a discussion of primary
jurisdiction and exclusivity. Part IV discusses the reasoning of the Arkansas
Supreme Court in VanWagoner. The note concludes with Part V which
suggests the possible implications of the VanWagoner decision on the future
of workers' compensation law in Arkansas.
U. SUMMARY OF FACTS
On the morning of February 15, 1995, Laurie VanWagoner slipped and
fell on a rug while walking down a hallway at Beverly Enterprises where she
was employed as an administrative assistant. 7 VanWagoner submitted a
Employee's Notice of Injury on a Form AR-N'8 to the Arkansas Workers'
10. See Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act of 1993, Act No. 796, (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997)).
11. See John D. Copeland, Workers' Compensation, Exclusivity, and the "Balderdash"
Response, 1996 ARK. L. NOTES 1, 1.
12. 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998).
13. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 13, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
14. See id.
15. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAvis & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 14.1 (3d ed. 1994).
16. See id.
17. See VanWagoner v. Beverly Enter., 334 Ark. 12, 13, 970 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1998).
18. See id. In Arkansas, an employee is required by statute to file a Form AR-N,
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Compensation Commission on February 29, 1996.'9 On October 15, 1996,
VanWagoner filed for workers' compensation benefits, asserting that her hip
injury was the result of a work-related accident.2" Beverly controverted her
claim and denied that VanWagoner's injury was compensable.2' Beverly
maintained that VanWagoner's injury resulted from pre-existing conditions.22
As a statutory defense, Beverly asserted that VanWagoner was not performing
employment services as defined under the Workers' Compensation Act23 since
she was on her way to the break room when the alleged fall occurred.24
VanWagoner's counsel requested cancellation of an April 9, 1997,
compensability determination hearing before the commission.25 Thereafter,
on May 15, 1997, VanWagoner instituted a civil action in the Sebastian
County Circuit Court in Fort Smith, Arkansas, alleging that Beverly Enter-
prises's negligent failure to maintain its premises was the proximate cause of
VanWagoner's slip and fall injury.26 VanWagoner claimed that the Workers'
Compensation Act could not provide an exclusive remedy since she was not
providing employment services when the alleged fall occurred.27 The circuit
court dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred the suit.2" VanWagoner
appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals which certified the case to the
Supreme Court of Arkansas.29 In affirming the decision of the circuit court,
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion has primary jurisdiction to determine if cases fall within its jurisdiction
and within the Workers' Compensation Act.3"
"Employee's Notice of Injury." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-701 (Michie 1996).
19. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 13, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. A compensable injury does not include an "[i]njury which was inflicted upon
the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed, or before the
employee was hired or after the employment relationship was terminated." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997).
24. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 12, 970 S.W.2d at 810.
25. See Van Wagoner, 334 Ark. at 13-14, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 810-11.
28. See id.
29. See id. The action was certified pursuant to ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d)(2) as involving
an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance. See id.
30. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 15, 970 S.W.2d at 812.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Background of Workers' Compensation in the United States
As early as 1841, workers in the United States began suing their
employers on negligence principles."' However, in order to recover damages,
the employee had to prove the employer's negligence.3 2 This was no easy task
for the employee, who met obstacles in the common law that practically
ensured the employee's defeat.33 Employers easily overcame employee
actions for work-related injuries with the common law defenses of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine.34 In
addition to these obstacles, fellow employees feared employer retaliation for
offering- supporting testimony for an injured co-worker.35 Furthermore,
litigation was costly for both the employer and the employee, and the money
expended in litigation benefitted neither party.36 Consequently, the common
law left a majority of workers uncompensated for their injuries.37
With increased industrialization, the number of worker injuries increased
correspondingly, and the common law remedy remained inadequate.3" The
common law came to be viewed as both economically and morally unjust.39
31. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 777 (1982). Although there were earlier cases of
employees suing employers over occupational injuries, Murray v. South Carolina Railroad is
one of the earliest documented cases in the United States. See id. (citing 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.)
385 (1841)).
32. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 13.
33. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 13.
34. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 4.30 (1998). Under contributory negligence, an employee could not recover from the
employer if the employee's own negligence contributed to the injury. See id. Under the
assumption of risk doctrine, an employee could not recover from the employer for accidents
arising from risks associated with the job that the employee should have recognized. See id.
Under the fellow servant doctrine, an employee could not recover from the employer for injuries
sustained from the negligence of a fellow employee. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 265. Money spent on litigation could have been spent
by employers to further the industry, but instead many employers chose to run the risk of being
held liable rather than install safer equipment. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 265.
37. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness ofAn Employee's Workers 'Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405,415 (1988) (citing PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 572 n.43 (5th ed. 1984)). Seventy to ninety-four percent of all
industrial accidents were uncompensated. See id.
38. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 264.
39. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 266-67 (discussing declarations of purpose made by
several states in establishing their workers' compensation statutes).
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Under workers' compensation, work-related injuries would be treated as a cost
of production which should be paid by the industry and the consumer.40
The first steps toward altering the common law defenses began with the
judiciary, and legislative efforts soon followed. 4,' Each stage in the develop-
ment of workers' compensation in the United States mirrored the develop-
ments in England.42 In 1880, the English Parliament passed the English
Employers' Liability Act43 which served as a model for early statutes in the
United States.44 The Employers' Liability Act displaced the common law
defenses with respect to certain injuries but still retained a negligence
standard.45
The next legislative phase ushered in modem compensation statutes
beginning with the passage of the British Workers' Compensation Act in
1897.' It stimulated American interest, and states began assembling experts
and commissions to investigate the proposition of state workers' compensation
systems.47 The first enactments, beginning with New York, met with
constitutional challenge.48 In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals held the
1910 New York Act unconstitutional based on an impermissible exercise of
police power and stated that the taking of employer property without fault
amounted to a due process violation. 49 New York responded by adopting an
40. See Honnold, supra note 4, at 268.
41. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 4.40. Some courts carved out exceptions to the fellow
servant rule, such as the vice principle exception. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 4.40. This
exception in some states, excluded all supervisory employees from the fellow servant rule. See
LARSON, supra note 34, at § 4.40. Other states took a more expansive view and declared all
employees carrying out an employer's duties excluded from the rule. See LARSON, supra note
34, at § 4.40.
42. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 4.50.
43. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 4.50.
44. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 787. The Employer Liability Statutes of 1880 provided
that in the event of personal injury or death to a workman, the workman or the workman's
representative shall have the same right of compensation against the employer as ifthe workman
had not been a workman for the employer. See Epstein, supra note 3 1, at 787 & n.29.
45. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 797. The traditional common law rules governing
liability were displaced in five circumstances under the Act. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 788.
The first case dealt with defects in machinery or plant; the next three covered instances where
the employee acted under the supervision of other workers; the last circumstance covered
situations where the worker was injured by the negligence of any person in charge of railway
signals or engines. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 787-88 & n.29.
46. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 797 (citing 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37).
47. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.20.
48. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.20. Many of the first laws were compulsory and
denied the employer and employee the right to choose to be governed by the act. See LARSON,
supra note 34, at § 5.20.
49. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.20.
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amendment to the state constitution allowing the legislature to pass a
compulsory law."0
Other states answered the constitutional question by adopting legislation
that gave the employer an option to either be bound by the compensation plan
or be subject to common law actions without the common law defenses.'
Forty-two states passed compensation acts by 1920.52 In 1920, 41.2% of
workers were covered by workers' compensation, and that figure steadily rose
to 81.5% in 1940 and to 87% in 1989, where it remained steady.53
Workers' compensation in the United States is based on a no-fault
approach.' The system relieves the employee from having to prove the
employer's negligence in a tort action and results in quicker recovery,
although compensation is generally less than a tort recovery.5 Likewise, an
employer benefits by avoiding potentially costly tort damages.56 Regardless
of employer fault or employee negligence, an injured employee usually
recovers as long as the injury arose out of and in the course of employment
and was sustained during the employment relationship.57
The amount awarded to the injured worker depends on the employee's
earning capacity." Contrasted with tort damages where there is no maximum
limit on recovery, workers' compensation awards have a statutory base that
focuses on the employee's disability and sets a maximum for recovery.59
50. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.20
51. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.20.
52. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.30. Today all states have adopted a workers'
compensation system. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.30.
53. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 5.30 (citing WLIAM J. NELSON, JR., WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: 1894-1998 BENCHMARK REVISIONS SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN (1992)).
54. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 14-15.
55. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 14-15.
56. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 14-15.
57. See Samenga, supranote 2, at 14-15. Act 796 of 1993 imposed more requirements
on recovery and redefined compensable injury. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997). In Arkansas, a compensable injury is an "accidental injury...
arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results
in disability or death. An injury is 'accidental' only if it is caused by a specific incident and is
identifiable by time and place of occurrence." ARK. CODE ANN. § I I-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1997). The section continues to define injuries that are not compensable under
the Act. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(B) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997). Many states,
including Arkansas, have broken down the phrase "arising out of the course of employment"
so that "arising" relates to causal origin and "in the course of employment" relates to the time,
place and circumstance surrounding the accident. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 6.10.
58. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.40. The employee is entitled to medical and
temporary disability benefits. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1 1-9-102(F)(i) (Michie 1996 & Supp.
1997). Injuries, like loss of sexual potency or loss of sensory organs that may produce large tort
damages go uncompensated under the workers' compensation system since these injuries do not
effect earning capacity. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.40.
59. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.50. Most states base compensation on a percentage
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Workers' compensation recovery in most states is limited to an amount based
on the state's average weekly wage.6" The statutory scheme categorizes the
worker's injury into one of four categories based on the degree and duration
of the injury.6 '
B. Exclusivity and Workers' Compensation Law in Arkansas
As part of the compromise between employers and employees, workers'
compensation benefits provide the exclusive remedy for an employee's
occupational injuries arising during the course of employment.62 The
employer avoids liability for tort damages, and in exchange, the employee may
obtain compensation even if negligent.63 However, judicially created
exceptions including the dual capacity doctrine, dual persona doctrine, third
party contribution and the intentional torts exception have chipped away at the
of the worker's average wage between one-half and two-thirds and set a maximum weekly
recovery. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.50. The goal is to find an amount which will
compensate the worker but will not result in malingering. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.50.
60. See LARSON, supra note 34, at § 2.50. Under Act 796, the maximum weekly benefit
for a compensable injury is 85% of the state's average weekly wage. See ARK. CODE ANN. §
11-9-501 (b)(4) (Michie 1996).
61. See 4 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 57.12(a). The four categories are "temporary
partial, temporary total, permanent partial, or permanent total" with death cases receiving
different treatment. See 4 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 57.12(a). The following are a sample
of maximum benefits for selected permanent partial injuries: loss of arm at the elbow, 244
weeks; loss of arm between elbow and wrist, 183 weeks; loss of hearing in both ears, 158 weeks;
loss of leg at knee, 184 weeks; loss of leg between knee and ankle, 131 weeks; loss of thumb,
73 weeks; loss of big toe, 32 weeks; loss of first finger 43 weeks. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
52 1(a) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997).
62. See 5 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 65.00. The Arkansas exclusive remedy provision
states that "[tihe rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this
chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the
employee .... ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105(a) (Michie 1996). Workers who are injured by
third parties are not bound by the exclusive remedy rule, and the worker may receive benefits
from the employer and sue the third party for damages. See 5 LARSON, supra note 34, at §
65.00. Statutory recovery from the employer must be reimbursed from any tort award to avoid
double recovery. See 5 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 65.00.
63. See Samenga, supra note 2, at 14. Supporters of workers' compensation argue that the
system was never meant to provide workers will full compensation and the judicial exceptions
to exclusivity threaten to dismantle the quid pro quo. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 809.
Supporters also argue that low damages are necessary since they keep down costs of
administering the system, prevent fraudulent claims, and encourage employees to take increased
self protection measures. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 800-01. Critics argue that the current
system is inadequate in light of the increased value of an employee's common law rights and
the courts have properly allowed exceptions to exclusivity. See Note, Exceptions to the
Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1641,
1644 (1983).
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exclusive remedy provision' and have encouraged employees to pursue tort
remedies while leaving employers uncertain about their obligations.
The intentional tort exception is founded on the notion that intentional
torts are not accidental and are by definition excluded from the statute.65 Most
states require that the employee show more than the employer's acting with
gross negligence, recklessness or willfulness in order to succeed on an
intentional tort claim.6
In Arkansas, the employee must show actual, specific, and deliberate
intent on the part of the employer to injure the employee.67 This requires that
the worker plead more than bare allegations, and the nature of the employer's
acts determine the cause of action." Once proven, the intentional act severs
the employment relationship and allows the worker to sue the employer in
tort.69 In Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Dry Cleaners Company,7" the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a general manager's unprovoked assault on the
64. See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers'
Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405 (1988) (addressing
numerous other grounds for employee's civil suits). The dual capacity doctrine and suits for
contribution have been rejected by most states who have considered them, but the intentional
tort exception has been widely accepted because of a general belief such injuries are outside of
workers' compensation coverage which is limited to accidental injuries. See Note, Exceptions
to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1641, 1653 (1983) (advocating that increased judicial acceptance to employee tort suits will
bring about desirable results by increasing workers' compensation benefits and workplace
safety).
65. See 6 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 68.00. Misrepresentation, nuisance, or defamation
are just a few of the numerous other torts workers may sue their employers on. See generally
King, supra note 64, at 405. Courts adhering to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction do so under
the rationale that certain factual questions fall within the expertise of the administrative body.
See Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 934 P.2d 1074, 1079 (N.M. 1997). The workers' compensation
boards manage benefit payments to workers for work-related accidents and can more efficiently
process claims and resolve factual questions within the agency's expertise. See id. This
rationale is not applicable in an employee's common law claim for an intentional wrong. See
id. In this instance, it is preferable for the court to assume priority over the board since the issue
is a matter of law. See id. Furthermore, a worker may be disadvantaged by having to prove
intent to the board where the opportunities for discovery are limited and a right to trial by jury
may be jeopardized. See id.
66. See 6 LARSON, supra note 34, at § 68.13.
67. See Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 461, 692 S.W.2d 615, 617 (1985). An
employer's failure to warn of dangers, provide a safe working environment, or violation of
government regulations may place the employee in a dangerous situation. See id. at 460-61,692
S.W.2d at 617-18. However, such acts or omissions on the part of the employer do not remove
the act or omission from the purview of exclusivity. See id. at 461,692 S.W.2d at 617-18. The
employer's act must show an intent to injure the employee or a desire to bring about the
expected consequences of the act. See id.
68. See Ensco, 286 Ark. at 461, 692 S.W.2d at 617.
69. See Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Dry Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 355, 230 S.W.2d
28, 32 (1950).
70. See id.
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employee during the course of employment could entitle the plaintiff to
common law damages."'
The dual capacity doctrine releases an employee from under the
exclusive remedy rule by allowing the employee to sue the employer acting
in a third party capacity.72 Those seeking to use the exception argue that the
employer is being sued not as an employer but in some other capacity such as
owner or lessor of property on which the injury occurred or as the installer of
equipment that injured the employee.73 Dual capacity does have validity
where the employer in fact assumes a role totally unrelated to that of the
employer or in situations where an employee is suing an employer for injuries
sustained outside the employment relationship.74 The rationale prevents
employers who assume dual roles outside the employment relationship from
avoiding tort actions.75 Advocates against the dual capacity exception fear it
will not be limited to the extreme cases where the employer and employee are
brought together by circumstances outside of the employment relationship; but
will overwhelm exclusivity by including cases where the two are joined by a
relationship in addition to employment.76
The dual persona doctrine, related to the dual capacity doctrine, also
allows the injured worker to sue an employer in tort.77 This doctrine assumes
that the employer has several legal personas and the employer may take on a
separate legal status.7' The best example is found in modem day business
where an individual may be operating several companies. 79 An employee
working for one of the companies may attempt to sue another of the compa-
nies in tort.8" The exception has justification where there is no employment
relationship between the injured employee and the company the worker is
suing. However, the same danger that exists with dual capacity is present in
dual persona, in that dual persona could be extended in a way inconsistent
with exclusivity if employees could sue one of several operationally
71. See Heskett, 217 Ark. at 356, 230 S.W.2d at 32.
72. See King, supra note 64, at 492.
73. See King, supra note 64, at 492-96.
74. See King, supra note 64, at 492-96.
75. See King, supra note 64, at 492-96. Employers assume many other roles with respect
to employees including landowner, manufacturer, installer, bailor, or safety inspector. See
Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991) (citing 2A ARTHUR
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 72.8 1(a) (1990)). Larson states that a
court's recognition of this doctrine severely weakens exclusivity. See id.
76. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 810-11.
77. See Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991). Arkansas
adopted the dual persona exception in this case. See id. at 231, 812 S.W.2d at 674-75.
78. See Valmac, 306 Ark. at 231, 812 S.W.2d at 674-75.
79. See Cash v. Carter, 312 Ark. 41, 847 S.W.2d 18 (1993).
80. See id.
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interrelated companies simply because there were some overlapping
ownership interests.8'
Anotherjudicial exception to the exclusivity doctrine includes third party
suits for contribution and indemnity which involve attempts to allocate
liability fairly between employers and third parties who share the responsibil-
ity for the worker's injuries.82 An injured worker may sue the third party for
all damages, and the third party may seek indemnity from the employer.83 If
some or all of the tort cost can be shifted from the third party to the worker's
employer, the protection the employer receives under the exclusive remedy
rule is compromised." Therefore, claims by third parties for contribution and
indemnity represent an indirect exception to exclusivity.85
In 1993, the Arkansas legislature drastically altered the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation statute.86 Among the changes, Act 796 broadened the
scope of the exclusivity doctrine by eliminating some of the judicial
exceptions, thus preventing future expansion by the Arkansas courts.87 The
legislature warned that exclusivity was not to be broadened by administrative
law judges, the commission, or the Arkansas courts.88
C. An Explanation of Primary Jurisdiction
The courts use the doctrine ofprimaryjurisdiction to refer initial decision
making to administrative bodies to avoid conflict due to overlap between the
two tribunals.89 The reasoning behind the doctrine includes the notion that:
(1) the administrative body possesses expertise which makes it better equipped
than a court to make factual decisions falling within the scope of its statutory
81. See King, supra note 64, at 496.
82. See King, supra note 64, at 503-09.
83. See King, supra note 64, at 503-09.
84. See King, supra note 64, at 504.
85. See King, supra note 64, at 504.
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997). cf ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -811 (Michie 1987).
87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(e) (Michie 1996). The legislature specifically
denounced the court's attempt to carve exceptions from the exclusivity doctrine and annulled
Thomas and two other cases cutting into exclusivity, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306
Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483
(1991). See id. Under the Act, the intentional tort and third party contribution exceptions
remain intact. See id
88. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-1001 (Michie 1996).
89. See 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1. One commentator asserts that primary
jurisdiction cannot be stated in a formula, but may be seen as an attempt to resolve procedural
and substantive conflicts created when the original jurisdiction granted to an agency confronts
the original jurisdiction of the court. See Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 1037, 1037 (1963-64).
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jurisdiction; (2) the doctrine also promotes uniformity in decisions; and (3)
prevents judicial interference with agency jurisdiction.90 There are two ways
primary jurisdiction may be used.9 First, a court may decide to refer
particular issues of a case to the agency while retaining jurisdiction over the
action.92 Second, a court may conclude that the entire action falls within the
agency's jurisdiction and dismiss the entire action.9 s The court may refer
initial decision making power to the agency but retain the right to set aside the
agency's resolution of the issue on review.' The agency decision is granted
deference, however, by a reviewing court.95
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was first used in Texas & Pacific
Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company- when Abilene Cotton sued the
railway to recover shipping charges on carloads of cotton seed that it deemed
excessive and unreasonable. 97 The United States Supreme Court held that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the rate charged was
reasonable and in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.9 Abilene was
required to seek redress with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had
original jurisdiction over such matters." Although the Court's decision
contradicted the plain language of the Act,"" the Court did more to follow
through with Congressional intent by establishing a rule to provide for
uniformity in decisions.' The ICC Act applied nationwide and resort to the
board in the first instance ensured the resolution of disputes in a consistent
manner."1
2
90. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1.
91. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
does not apply to pure questions of law which fall exclusively within the court's jurisdiction.
See Great Northern R.R. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
92. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1.
93. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1.
94. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1.
95. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.1.
96. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
97. See Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 430. See generally WILLIAM F. Fox, JR.,
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 69, at 238 (1986).
98. See Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 448.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 446. "... [N]othing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in
addition to such remedies." Id.
101. See id. at 446-47. Under the ICC Act the shipper could choose the forum for redress,
and the shipper chose to file in state court. See id. Allowing a plaintiff a forum choice under
the Act left the chance the decisions and remedies granted by the ICC and the courts would not
be uniform. See id.
102. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.24, at 487 (2d ed. 1984). The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is judge-made. See id. As seen in Abilene Cotton it may be
applied when policy concerns so dictate. See id.
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Whereas Abilene Cotton involved an entire case that fell within the
exclusive primaryjurisdiction of the agency, primaryjurisdiction also applies
where the court retains jurisdiction over the case but refers certain factual
issues to the agency.' In United States v. Western Pacific Railway,""° the
government shipped napalm bombs without fuses, and the railroad charged the
United States government the rate that applied to live incendiary devices.'0 5
The United States contended that, since the bombs had no fuses, a lower rate
should apply." The government refused to pay the higher rate, and the
shipper brought suit in the United States Court of Claims.0 7 The Court of
Claims held that the court should determine which rate applied since the issue
was a matter of law that did not require resort to the agency. 8 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the court must first refer to the agency where the
dispute involved two issues that combined questions of fact and law: 1)
interpretation of tariff language and 2) the reasonableness of the tariff."
This variant of primary jurisdiction was used in later antitrust cases like
Far East Conference v. UnitedStates."' The Court again chose to refer to the
agency on issues involving agency expertise while retaining jurisdiction over
the matter." By following the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction and declining
to resolve jurisdictional or factual issues, the court avoids the possibility of
interfering with an agency's statutory responsibilities.1 ' The agency opinion,
however, is not binding on the court."3 In Federal Maritime Board v.
Iserbrandtsen Company,"' the board's order was set aside by the court."5
103. See id.
104. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
105. See id. at 60.
106. See id. at 61.
107. See id. at 62.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 63.
110. 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Water carriers agreed to a rate system whereby shippers who
dealt exclusively with members of the conference received a better rate. See id. at 572. The
government brought an anti-trust suit, and the Court dismissed the action to the Federal
Maritime Board to determine the reasonableness of the dual rate system. See id. at 571. The
Court retained jurisdiction over the case which involved anti-trust issues for which the board
could not grant relief. See id.
111. Seeid. at575.
112. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.2.
113. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 15, at § 14.2.
114. 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
115. See id.
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D. Who Has Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction?
Employee attempts to circumvent the workers' compensation commission
in order to procure larger tort damage awards are forcing courts to confront
the issue of which forum has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the
workers' compensation laws." 6 There are a number of possibilities for
resolving the issue. The court may allow the board to have priority and
strictly follow the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction."" In the alternative, a rule
of concurrent jurisdiction" 8 may be adopted or states may create some
combination of the two extremes." 9 The problem is apparent in the situation
where an employee files a tort action and the employer seeks to have the
action dismissed based on the exclusive remedy provision of the workers'
compensation act. 2 Questions as to the existence of an employment
relationship and whether the injury arose during the course of employment are
only two of the initial factual inquiries a forum must make before determining
whether the worker plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the workers'
compensation scheme or whether tort remedies are available. 2' Only a few
states have addressed the question in unambiguous terms.'22 This note next
looks to the differing ways courts have addressed overlapping jurisdiction
between courts and agencies.'23
1. The Approach of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The majority position, first established in Scott v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 124 allows the tribunal where the claim is first filed to assume
jurisdiction, and the outcome of the proceedings are res judicata in a later
116. See generally Daniel Keating, Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or Boards
Decide Whether Workers' Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 258 (1986).
(advocating thatjurisdictional questions be referred to the commission upon the motion of either
party.)
117. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 12, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
118. See Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 293 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1956).
119. See discussion infra Part II D.
120. See Keating, supra note 116, at 260.
121. See Keating, supra note 116, at 260.
122. See Keating, supra note 116, at 260.
123. The cases discussed in this note are not an exhaustive list of states adopting the various
approaches.
124. 293 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1956).
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
claim initiated.'25 The courts and the board have concurrent jurisdiction, but
once the board or the court assumes jurisdiction, jurisdiction is exclusive.'26
In Scott, the plaintiff filed a personal injury action for damages, and
during the proceeding, the defendant company sought an adjustment with the
Industrial Accident Commission for the same injuries on the grounds they
were suffered in the course of employment.'27 Since the court assumed
jurisdiction before the board did, its decisions onjurisdiction were resjudicata
for the proceeding before the board. 2  The California court stated that it
could not award workers' compensation damages and the board could not
award civil damages, but both forums could pass on the issue of
jurisdiction. 129
The Scott court based its decision on policy and stated that a rule of
concurrentjurisdiction protects parties from multiple litigation. 30 The Scott
court also addressed the race to file in which the employee races to file a tort
claim and the employer races to file an adjustment before the board-both
knowing that the party to file first will have the claim resolved in the tribunal
of their choice.' This majority approach is criticized for leading to
duplicative litigation, resulting in an unnecessary footrace between the parties,
and leading to conflicting results. 1
3 2
A variation on the majority approach of concurrent jurisdiction includes
the cases that have allowed proceedings to go forward in both forums until the
issue ofjurisdiction is resolved in either tribunal.'1 Courts suggest that the
rationale behind this approach is that there is no evidence it would be better
to refer to the board for a determination of subject matter jurisdiction, nor is
the board's expertise required in making such factual determinations.'
125. See id. at 22. Jurisdictions following the majority approach include California, Idaho,
Montana, Delaware, and Oklahoma. See Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277 (Del.
1981); Rex Truck Lines v. Simms, 401 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965); Hansen v. Harvey, 806 P.2d 426
(Idaho 1991); Profitt v. J.G. Watts Constr., 370 P.2d 878 (Mont. 1962).
126. See Scott, 293 P.2d at 21. The Scott court discussed two possibilities for resolution
of the case. See id. at 21-22. The court adopted a rule of concurrent jurisdiction but addressed
the alternative of allowing the two tribunals to proceed until one reached a final determination
on jurisdiction. See id. at 24-25. The alternative not addressed by the court was primary
jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part Il1.
127. See Scott, 293 P.2d at 20.
128. See id. at 22.
129. See id.
130. See id. at25.
131. See id.
132. See generally Keating, supra note 116, at 258.
133. See Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277 (Del. 1981). Two California cases
have followed this approach. See Jones v. Brown, 13 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1970); Busick v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 500 P.2d 1386 (Cal. 1972).
134. See Ward, 431 A.2d at 1283.
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Finally, appeals will be made to the court which will ultimately have the final
say on the board's determination.'35 This approach may be easily criticized for
leading to duplicative litigation, resulting in the unnecessary waste of time,
resources and money to maintain two proceedings.'36
2. The Michigan and Missouri Approach
Under the approach followed by Michigan and Missouri, the court has
the power to decide if an employment relationship exists, but the court cannot
determine if the accident occurred during the course of employment.'37 The
rationale behind such a split of these issues is based on the determination that
employment status is not an issue requiring agency expertise.'38 In Killian v.
J. J. Installers, Incorporated,'39 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
question of whether the injuries were the product of an accident or a result of
intentional conduct was a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
commission. 40 The Killian court cited the earlier case of Hannah v.
Mallinckrodt'4' where the court held that concurrent jurisdiction between the
board and the courts would nullify the purpose of the legislative intent which
places exclusive jurisdiction in the commission. 42
The Michigan Supreme Court likewise held that the courts retain the
power to decide the issue of employment, and the board determines whether
the injuries were suffered during the course of employment. 143 Again, the
rationale of the court is that the employment inquiry is "more fundamental"
and is left to the courts to decide.'" The courts following this approach have
failed to articulate why the employment inquiry is "more fundamental" than
the course of employment issue. 14 In order for an injury to be compensable,
the injury must be sustained at the time an employment relationship existed,
and the injury must occur during the course of employment.'" Both
conditions appear to be equally fundamental in that if either condition is not
satisfied the employee cannot recover workers' compensation benefits.'47 The
135. See id.
136. See generally Keating, supra note 116, at 258.
137. See Killian v. J. J. Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. 1991).
138. See Lamar v. Ford Motor, Co., 409 S.W.2d 100, 107 (Mo. 1966).
139. 802 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1991).
140. See Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 161.
141. 633 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. 1982).
142. See Hannah, 633 S.W.2d at 160.
143. See Sewell v. Clearing Mach. Corp., 347 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1984).
144. See id. at 450.
145. See id. at 454 (Levin, J., concurring).
146. See id. (Levin, J., concurring).
147. See id. (Levin, J., concurring).
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"more fundamental" test is criticized for providing little guidance for the
courts in future cases.
148
3. The Substantial Question Approach
Under this approach, the court has the power to determinejurisdiction as
long as no substantial jurisdictional question exists.'49 If a jurisdictional
question remains, then the court must refer to the board. 5 ' In the event the
court feels all factual issues are settled, the court may make a decision as a
matter of law without referring to the board.' Where there is a substantial
question as to whether an employee's injuries are covered by an employment
compensation statute, the employee must first pursue a remedy under the
workers' compensation system and allow the agency to make initial decisions
concerning coverage.'52
This approach is consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
because it requires courts to refer to agencies for the resolution of issues that
have been placed within their competence and expertise.'53 Courts are able to
ensure uniformity in the application of the statute, and the agency is not
weakened by allowing persons to circumvent its jurisdiction.'54
In O 'Rouke v. Long,'55 a ten-year-old newspaper carrier was struck by a
truck and injured while trying to cross a street to buy an ice cream cone during
his deliveries. 56 In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's tort claim, the
New York Court of Appeals found that questions of fact or mixed questions
of law and fact should be left to the workers' compensation board to
determine, and that the plaintiff may not choose the courts as the forum to
resolve such issues.
57
148. See id. (Levin, J., concurring).
149. See Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658,661 (App. D.C. 1979). Jurisdictions adopting
this view include New York, the District of Columbia and New Mexico.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 661. The court held that there was a'substantial question as to whether the
husband's death occurred in the course of employment and therefore was not caused by the
intoxication of the husband. See id. at 662. The court stated it would be best for the court to
determine if a substantial question existed and then stay proceedings if issues must be referred
to the board. See id. at n.7. This would provide for judicial economy and prevent the statute
of limitations from running. See id.
153. See id. at 662.
154. See Abilene Cotton, 352 U.S. at 446-47.
155. 359 N.E.2d 1347 (N.Y. 1976).
156. See id. at 1349.
157. See id. at 1355.
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The substantial question approach avoids the race to file and leads to
more uniform decisions. 58 However, courts following this approach have
failed to define what constitutes a substantial question requiring the court to
refer to the board. 159 Since the court retains the ability to resolve the conflict
when there is no factual issue, the question remains as to what the court will
characterize as a matter of law. Under this approach, the employee still has
an incentive to file a tort claim and to press the limits of the substantial
question approach."6
In announcing its decision to follow the rule of primary jurisdiction, the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Van Wagoner placed Arkansas closest in line with
the jurisdictions following the substantial question approach. Under a rule of
primary jurisdiction, the Arkansas courts are now required to refer to the
workers' compensation board on all jurisdictional matters. 6 ' This requires the
court to dismiss an action and forces the worker to first seek redress through
the workers' compensation system. 162 The court may resolve a dispute only
when the facts are so one-sided as to become an issue of law. 63 Although
Arkansas previously followed the majority ofjurisdictions by adopting a rule
of concurrent jurisdiction as first set forth by the Scott court in California, the
Arkansas Supreme Court overturned precedent for the reasons discussed in the
following section.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Van Wagoner v. Beverly Enterprises,' the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the Workers' Compensation Commission has exclusive, original
jurisdiction to determine fact issues falling within itsjurisdiction. 65 The court
overturned earlier decisions granting the Commission and the courts
concurrent jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional issues and adopted the
doctrine of primaryjurisdiction. l" The court focused on the legislative intent
and purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, which intended that
jurisdictional questions be left to the commission's expertise. 67
158. See Keating, supra note 116, at 272.
159. See Keating, supra note 116, at 272.
160. See Keating, supra note 116, at 272-73.
161. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 812.
162. Seeid.
163. Seeid.
164. 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 811 (citing Craig v. Taylor, 223 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d
257 (1996); Lively v. Libbey Mem'l Physical Med. Ctr., Inc., 317 Ark. 518, 875 S.W.2d 507
(1994)).
167. See id. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 811 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105(a) (Michie 1996
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According to the majority, concurrent jurisdiction undermines the
purpose of the Act by denying the Commission the exclusive right to
administer the laws and remedies of the act.6 8 The court presented numerous
reasons in support of abolishing concurrent jurisdiction, including a concern
that the Commission may be prevented from deciding the rights and remedies
of the Act. 69 The court stated that by filing with a circuit court parties could
circumvent the Commission, thereby leaving many jurisdictional questions to
the court. 7" The Arkansas Supreme Court also expressed a fear that
concurrentjurisdiction encourages parties to file in both forums, thus creating
a threat of duplicate litigation.'
In support of its decision, the court relied on the work of several
commentators including Daniel Keating and Arthur Larson.'72 In his article,
Daniel Keating explains how concurrent jurisdiction could lead to diverse
decisions even on similar facts when left to both juries and the commission.'73
The court also relied on the work of Professor Larson and his recognition of
the administrative law rule of primary jurisdiction. 74 According to Larson,
a commission should have original jurisdiction in all cases except those where
the facts are so one-sided that the matter becomes an issue of law."7 The
court emphasized the reasoning of Keating and Larson who conclude that
primary jurisdiction provides for efficiency, simplicity, and uniformity in the
disposal of cases.'76
Justice Imber declined to accept the court's reasoning and objected to the
majority's decision to abolish concurrent jurisdiction."' She reasoned that
concurrent jurisdiction granted courts jurisdiction to determine the existence
of an employment relationship.'78 If an employment relationship exists
between the parties, then the court cannot retainjurisdiction over the case, and
& Supp. 1997)).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 812.
172. See id. at 15, 970 S.W.2d at 812 (citing 6 ARTHuR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 67.60 (1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998)); Keating, supra note 116, at 271.
173. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 812. (citing Daniel Keating,
Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or Boards Decide Whether Workers' Compensation
Laws Apply?, 53 U. CFH. L. REV. 258, 271 (1986)).
174. See id. (citing 6 ARThuR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 67.60
(1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998)).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 811 (citing 6 ARTHuR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 67.60 (1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998)); Keating, supra note 116, at 271.
177. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 16, 970 S.W.2d at 813 (Imber, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 17, 970 S.W.2d at 813 (Imber, J., concurring).
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it must be dismissed to the jurisdiction of the commission."" Therefore, she
concluded that there is no threat that a party may circumvent the commission
even if the party is allowed to file in either tribunal.' Justice Imber stated
that the establishment of the relationship between the parties is a condition
precedent to determining jurisdiction to hear the case. 8'
The concurrence questioned whether the majority had succeeded in
abolishing concurrentjurisdiction considering the fact that a party may file in
either tribunal for an intentional tort committed by an employer.' Justice
Imber reasoned that concurrent jurisdiction remains where the facts show an
employer acted with intent.8 3 Finally, the concurrence questioned the court's
acceptance of Professor Larson's work in light of the fact that the court
rejected it only two years earlier.'"
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Before Act 796, the Arkansas courts construed the provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally in connection with the purpose of the
Act."'85 Current law mandates, however, that the court and the commission
construe the provisions of the act strictly,8 6 and the court's decision in
Van Wagoner upholds the legislative intent.
The most obvious and general effect of VanWagoner is that it changes
how cases will be tried in Arkansas by dictating how plaintiffs must proceed
with work-related claims. The VanWagoner decision limits plaintiff access
to the courts by requiring the plaintiff to go before the Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission for an initial determination of whether workers' compensa-
tion even applies.
Another general effect of a rule of primary jurisdiction on Arkansas
workers' compensation law includes the elimination of confusion that may be
wrought by a rule ofconcurrentjurisdiction whereby similar cases are handled
differently by the courts and by the commission. A rule that requires the court
to refer to the Workers' Compensation Commission on jurisdictional issues
promotes stability and uniformity in decision making.
179. See id. at 18, 970 S.W.2d at 813-14 (Imber, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 17, 970 S.W.2d at 813 (Imber, J., concurring).
181. See id. at 19, 9.70 S.W.2d at 814 (Imber, J., concurring).
182. See id. (Imber, J., concurring).
183. See VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 19, 970 S.W.2d at 813 (Imber, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 19, 970 S.W.2d at 814 (Imber, J., concurring) (citing Craig v. Traylor, 323
Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996)).
185. See City of Blytheville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997).
186. See id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 11 -9-704(c)(3) (Michie 1996)).
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Less obvious are the effects VanWagoner will have on workers'
compensation claimants and the system. At the very least, a rule of primary
jurisdiction will delay the resolution of tort suits in cases where the commis-
sion rules that workers' compensation is not applicable. Excluding the one
categorical exception involving intentional torts, the VanWagoner decision
dictates that worker plaintiffs must first seek redress with the commission
even for injuries that are clearly not compensable under workers' compensa-
tion. For these claimants, this becomes an exercise involving a remedy the
commission will deny. Workers are forced through the commission first,
which results in the expenditure of time, money, and other resources. Even
though a claimant will not bear any expense until after a claim is resolved, this
scenario has the effect of increasing costs and decreasing benefits. In
addition, during the time jurisdictional questions are pending, the claimant is
unable to collect for injuries or for medical bills. While the system was set up
to assure speedy compensation, this purpose is thwarted and the employee is
pushed toward settling the claim.
Even with what appears to be the firm rule established by Van Wagoner,
questions remain that will eventually have to be answered by the court. It
remains to be seen how the court will deal with the many other tort exceptions
such as defamation, the tort of outrage, or misrepresentation that do not come
under the workers' compensation scheme. Instead of forcing these claimants
through the commission for a determination on jurisdiction under a rule of
primary jurisdiction, the court may view these injuries as falling within the
one categorical exception recognized by the Van Wagoner majority where the
facts are so one-sided as to become an issue of law so that the court may
resolve the dispute. In the alternative, the court may decide that these injuries
are not covered by workers' compensation and therefore, the only remedy for
the worker is with the court system.
It is not clear how the Van Wagoner decision will ultimately effect worker
claimants and the workers' compensation system. For the present, it is enough
to know that workers and the attorneys who represent them can no longer
attempt to bypass the commission in search of a tort recovery; the commission
is now the forum of first resort, a stepping stone to the courts, the forum of
last resort.
Jill Jones Moore
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